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This paper examines the role of fiscal policies in the dynamics of the labor market.
Through the lenses of Okun’s Law, we assess how fiscal policy instruments as well as
fiscal consolidation and expansion episodes affect labor market outcomes. Using a
panel of 34 OECD countries over the period 1985-2013, we find that fiscal
consolidation has a sizeable, positive and robust impact on the Okun’s coefficient.
This effect is particularly strong for expenditure based consolidations, suggesting that
a reduction in the size of the government increases the responsiveness of
employment to output and is not altered by an expansionary or recessionary
position in the business cycle. Interestingly, we find no impact of fiscal expansion on
the Okun’s coefficient nor for specific fiscal instruments.
JEL classification: E24; E32; E62
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The global financial crisis has left its marks on labor market conditions in many ad-
vanced economies. Unemployment increased significantly in the OECD, adding eight
million unemployed from 2008 to 2014 (Fig. 1); improvements in labor markets over
the past years have been uneven (Fig. 2). The years of the crisis challenged policy
makers in addressing unemployment and triggered a series of old and new policy re-
sponses aimed at containing job losses through setting incentives for both labor de-
mand and supply (IMF 2010, IMF 2012, OECD 2009). Further, fiscal policy was tilted
toward supporting jobs by stimulating aggregate demand.
The objective of this paper is to examine the role of fiscal policies in the dynamics of
the labor market. It assesses how fiscal policy instruments and events (consolidation
and expansion) affect labor market outcomes. Traditionally the literature has addressed
the role of fiscal policy for employment either as a derivate of the output multiplier lit-
erature or through studies on the impact of specific fiscal policy instruments, such as
labor taxation and unemployment benefits. Against this literature, we provide an in-
novative angle to the analysis by examining the interplay of fiscal policy, employment
and output through the lenses of Okun’s Law. Observed first in the early 1960s, Okun’s
Law captures the empirical regularity between employment (unemployment) and out-
put, whereby output expansions are associated by employment expansions (or un-
employment reductions).2015 Bova et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
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Fig. 1 Unemployment Rates in OECD Countries (2008–14)
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reducing the Okun’s coefficient, not much evidence has been provided on the role
played by fiscal variables, namely fiscal policy instruments and episodes of fiscal expan-
sions or fiscal consolidation. To this end, this study re-addresses the issue of the stabil-
ity of Okun’s Law by looking at the role played by fiscal policy. Precisely, we investigate
whether fiscal and labor market policies can alter the responsiveness of employment
gaps to output gaps.
Using a panel of 34 OECD countries over the period 1985–2013, we calculate time-
varying Okun’s coefficients for each country. We first document variations over time
and across countries of Okun’s coefficients. Then, we estimate how these coefficients
are affected by fiscal policy — spending as well as tax components — and by fiscal
events — consolidation and expansions. We also control for the phases of the
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Fig. 2 Differences in Employment Rates Between September2014 and September 2008
Bova et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:13 Page 3 of 17output gaps. In line with the relevant literature, we examine the role played by labor
market policies and institutions — active and passive labor market policies as well as
employment protection legislation and include a monetary policy variable.
The key findings are as follows. Okun’s coefficients display large heterogeneity across
countries and over time. We find no impact of specific fiscal instruments on the Okun’s
coefficient, suggesting that increasing or reducing total spending or some spending
components and increasing or reducing tax rates would not alter the way employment
reacts to output. Against this, we find that fiscal consolidation has a sizeable, positive
and robust impact on the coefficient, suggesting that increasing tax revenues or redu-
cing the size of the government by reducing spending enhances the responsiveness of
employment to output. Interestingly, we find no impact of fiscal expansion on the
Okun’s coefficient. We further find that the impact of fiscal consolidation on the
Okun’s coefficient does not change according to the phases of the business cycle.
This finding suggests that during a consolidation episode, employment tends to be
more reactive to output than in normal times. If output is expanding then employment
would expand more than in normal times, while if output is contracting, employment
would contract more than in normal times. Hence, consolidating in good times (during
output expansion) is here found to positively affect employment. The result is robust
under a specification which includes the duration of the consolidation episode, expressed
in number of years. Further, distinguishing between expenditure-driven and revenue-
driven consolidation episodes, we find that the Okun’s coefficient is sensitive only to ex-
penditure reduction and not increases in revenue. This is an interesting result which may
highlight the presence of a crowding-in effect for the private sector when the govern-
ment size in the economy shrinks. Yet an analysis of the change in the compos-
ition of spending during consolidation is necessary to accurately interpret the finding in
light of a crowding-in effect for the private sector.
Finally, we confirm the finding of the literature that employment protection legisla-
tion weakens the responsiveness of employment to changes in output. In addition, we
find that active labor market policies magnify this impact, while unemployment benefits
and early retirement benefits do not alter the Okun’s coefficient. We also find that
monetary policy, here captured by the central bank money rate, has a negative impact
on the coefficient. This result could capture changes in labor demand not due to out-
put but rather caused by increases in the cost of capital relative to labor.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a review of
the literature on the stability of the Okun’s Law and on the way fiscal policy can impact
the labor market; Section III presents the empirical analysis, including model specifica-
tion, data and estimation results; Section IV concludes.2 Literature review
2.1 Stability of Okun’s coefficient
In his study of the United States unemployment dynamics for the period 1947–60,
Okun (1962) finds that a 1 % increase in Gross National Product (GNP) corresponds to
a 0.3 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate. This co-movement between
output and unemployment results from the fact that variations in output make firms
hire and fire workers, causing changes in employment and unemployment (Ball et al.
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in output, which in turn can depend on labor market rigidities and institutions, techno-
logical and training costs or costs created by employment protection laws. Accordingly,
some countries might exhibit different coefficients related to their own characteristics.
For instance, Ball et al. (2013) find an Okun’s coefficient as high as 0.8 for Spain, prob-
ably reflecting a large number of temporary workers, and a coefficient of 0.15 for Japan,
possibly resulting from the large use of permanent contracts and adjustments in wage
and bonus payments instead of lay-offs.
Although more an empirical regularity than a theoretical construct, Okun’s Law has
featured well as a forecasting instrument for employment dynamics in advanced econ-
omies (Ball et al. 2013). Yet labor market developments prevailing during the global fi-
nancial crisis have put the stability of Okun’s Law under question (Gordon 2010; Daly
and Hobijn 2010; Cazes et al. 2012; Daly et al. 2014). This debate emerged, in particu-
lar, from the observation that increases in unemployment in most advanced markets
were found to be larger than those expected under the Law. Some studies associated
this fact with changes in productivity (Gordon 2010; Daly and Hobijn 2010) and others
have put forward the argument of jobless recoveries (Jaimovich and Siu 2012; ILO
2014), acknowledging deviations from Okun’s Law.
The discussion on the over-time and cross-country stability of Okun’s Law is long
dated. The literature has commonly explained the heterogeneity (by country and
over time) by differences in labor market institutions, including the degree of protec-
tion and difficulty at which workers can be hired or laid off, changes in productivity,
and the elasticity of the labor force to output. Employment protection legislation is
found to be behind diverging changes in the Okun’s coefficient during the crisis
(Cazes et al. 2013). Soegner and Stiassny (2002) examine the stability of Okun’s coef-
ficients across 15 OECD countries over 1960–99 by means of Bayesian econometrics
and Kalman filtering and find that the heterogeneity across countries and over time
is explained by different degrees of labor market protection. Against these studies,
Ball et al. (2013) find a strong and stable relationship in most countries, but sizeable
variations across countries explained by national labor market characteristics other
than employment protection legislation. They justify the break during the crisis by
the fact that output grew more slowly in recent recoveries than in earlier ones and
find that unusual changes in productivity or in labor force participation were
relatively small.
Several studies provide evidence that productivity dynamics can explain changes in
the coefficients. By decomposing output, Gordon (2010) finds that changes in the rela-
tionship between output, hours and productivity contributed to jobless recoveries after
2000. Daly and Hobijn (2010) find that the main factor driving the unusual rise in the
United States unemployment relative to output during the financial crisis was very
rapid productivity growth which allowed businesses to cut back sharply on labor while
maintaining output levels. Similarly, by decomposing Okun’s coefficient, Daly et al.
(2013) provide evidence that productivity is more procyclical in recessions than in
normal times, reflecting greater variation in factor utilization around these times.
The procyclicality of Okun’s coefficient vis-à-vis the business cycle has been con-
firmed by Owyang and Sekhposyan (2012) who also find that periods of high unemploy-
ment are found to be correlated with increased sensitivity of the unemployment rate to
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the United States to be smaller (in absolute value) during expansions than recessions.
2.2 Fiscal policy and employment
In classical labor market models, labor demand identifies the number of workers (or
working hours) firms are willing to hire at any given rate of the real wage. Hiring deci-
sions depend on a firm’s profit maximization function and are thus determined by the
level of real wages, the marginal productivity of labor vis-à-vis the capital stock and the
level of technology. The labor supply identifies, instead, the number of workers willing
to supply labor at each level of the real wage by maximizing workers’ utility derived
from leisure activities and the consumption of goods and services. Within these dynam-
ics, fiscal policy can indeed affect firms and workers’ decisions, thereby boosting labor
demand and supply, or the structure of the labor market, removing frictions and pro-
moting skills. This can be done through higher spending, lower taxes, or alternatively
through ad hoc measures that improve the matching of workers with existing job va-
cancies and create incentives to work (Bassanini and Duval 2006; Estevão 2007; Card
et al. 2010; IMF 2012; and Orlandi 2012).
The literature has addressed employment effects of fiscal policy from different di-
mensions. On the one hand, the fiscal multiplier literature has examined the macroeco-
nomic impact of government spending (usually spending on goods and services) on
employment as a derivate of the impact on output. On the other hand, microeconomic
studies have investigated the effect of specific tax changes and government benefits on
labor demand and supply dynamics.
On the expenditure side, the literature documents a positive effect of public spending
on labor market outcomes. This effect operates mainly through aggregate demand:
spending on goods and services and capital spending directly affect aggregate demand
and through this labor demand. The impact of the wage bill is instead more direct, as
the public sector is often the largest employer in the country. For the United States,
studies find positive effects on employment following a government spending shock
(Fatás and Mihov 2001; Burnside et al. 2004; Cavallo 2005; Gali et al. 2003). In particu-
lar, Monacelli et al. (2010) provide an empirical estimate of the unemployment multi-
pliers of government spending, focusing in more detail on the transmission of fiscal
policy to the labor market. They show that an increase in government expenditure
boosts total hours, employment and the job finding probability. In a real business cycle
model with competitive labor markets and lump-sum taxation, Finn (1998) suggests
that an increase in government employment could lead to lower private sector employ-
ment (if the wealth effect is small) and higher real wages as well as lower private sector
hours, output and investment. However, Lane and Perotti (2003) and Alesina et al.
(2002) find evidence of the opposite impact. They show that an increase in government
purchases and the wage bill leads to higher wages in the private sector, lower firm
profits and ultimately lower employment and business investment in current and future
periods. As a result, output, household income and private consumption expenditure
contract.1
Still within spending, it is usually acknowledged that social benefits weaken the link
between labor supply and salaries (Nickell 1998; Nunziata 2002; Bassanini and Duval
2006; IMF 2012) by making labor more costly and reducing labor demand. Social
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rise. Duval and Bassanini estimate that a 10 % increase in unemployment benefits would
increase unemployment by 1.2 percentage points. Krueger and Meyer (2002) conclude
that a 10 % increase in unemployment benefits raises the average duration of unemploy-
ment by around 5 %—although this impact is likely to be much higher in countries with
relatively weak eligibility conditions. In the same vein, pension benefits (usually the largest
share of social benefits) tend to affect pension decisions and a higher number of retirees
would reduce the labor force and employment. Empirical evidence also suggests that
strengthening the link between contributions and benefits improves labor market out-
comes (Disney 2004).
On the revenue side, the literature agrees that labor taxes, including personal income
tax and social security contributions, negatively affect employment by influencing both
labor supply and demand. If the substitution effect prevails, higher taxes reduce after-
tax wages for workers who then supply less work as the incentive to opt for leisure as
opposed to work is now higher. Higher taxes on labor income can also reduce labor de-
mand by making labor more costly (Bassanini and Duval 2006). Whether the tax burden
is borne rather by workers than by firms ultimately depends on the price-elasticities of
labor supply and labor demand. For instance, Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) find that the
price elasticity of labor demand is close to about 1, while the elasticity of labor supply to
real wages is found to be between 0.2 and 0.5 % (IMF 2012).
Corporate taxes can affect employment by reducing investment and production and
by reducing labor supply to the extent that firms pass on these taxes to employees in
the form of lower wages. For instance, business tax relief can ease financing constraints
for firms relying on retained earnings and boost investment (IMF 2012). These effects
are consistent with the finding that reductions in the cost of capital reduce unemploy-
ment (Phelps 1994; Blanchard 1997). Likewise, taxes on final consumption (VAT, ex-
cises) increase the costs for consumption goods thereby reducing real wages, which, if
the substitution effect prevails over the wealth effect, would lower the labor supply at a
given reservation wage (IMF 2012).
Given prevailing elasticities, overall, compositional shifts of taxes from labor to con-
sumption taxes could boost labor demand. For instance, reductions in employer social
security contributions financed by higher consumption taxes (as in a fiscal devaluation
case) can raise labor demand by lowering (non-wage) labor costs (De Mooij and Keen
2013). The long-term employment effects of tax shifts depend on the extent to which
the tax burden is shifted away from labor income and onto other incomes. Although
increasing in number, studies on the impact of fiscal consolidations on employment are
still few (Daly et al. 2013; Turrini 2013; Jalles 2014; and Woo et al. 2013), and, to our
knowledge, only one study has at present examined the implication of consolidations
or expansions on the Okun’s Law. Using the Devries et al. (2011) database for
European countries, Turrini (2013) finds a temporary impact of fiscal consolidation on
cyclical unemployment, which is mainly due to expenditure measures and is higher for
countries with lower employment protection. Woo et al. (2013) find that increases in
unemployment are a major channel through which fiscal consolidations can affect in-
equality. Using Ramey’s (2011) definition of fiscal expansion, Daly et al. (2013) examine
responses of the Okun’s coefficients to a fiscal expansion shock in the United States.
They find a small output reaction and no adjustment in employment but in hours




To assess the impact of fiscal policies on employment, we base our analysis on the
short-term relationship between employment gaps and output gaps, used as one of the
two main specifications for Okun’s Law.2 We adopt a two-step approach.
In the first step, we estimate a time-varying Okun’s Law coefficient for each country.
The time-varying and country-specific impact of the output gap on the employment
gap is derived following the model specification below.
eit ¼ αit þ βit yit þ ηit ð1Þ
eit denotes the employment gap of country I at time t, calculated as the deviation of
current employment from its trend; yit is the output gap, obtained as the deviation of
actual output from potential output. The employment trend (or long-term level) and
potential output were calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filtering. We use 6.25 as a
smoothing parameter for the results reported below, with no significant change when
applying other parameters. αit and βit are time-varying intercept and Okun’s coefficient,
and ηit is the error term. Equation (1) is estimated using local Gaussian-weighted
ordinary least squares (see Aghion and Marinescu 2008). This technique determines
the time-varying Okun’s coefficient β^it for country i at year t by using all observations
over the available time span and assigning greater weights to those observations closest
to the reference year. This is achieved by giving a Gaussian-centered weight to the
reference period. If τ denotes the length of the rolling window, then the error term ϑit
follows a normal distribution function:
N 0; σ2=wt τð Þ with wt τð Þ ¼ 1




; τ∈ t−5; t þ 4ð Þ
 !
ð2Þ
The smoothing parameter σ is arbitrarily set to 3 as the results are qualitatively ro-bust to slight changes of this parameter.
In the second step, the coefficients β^it are regressed on fiscal variables. This is repre-
sented in equation (3) below.
β^ it ¼ γ þ δFFIFi;t þ
XJ
j¼1λjXjit þ θi þ θt þ εit0 ð3Þ
where FIFi;t denotes the respective fiscal instrument, δ
F captures the impact of the fiscal
instrument under consideration on the Okun’s coefficient and Xj represents control
variables including the stance of monetary policy (primarily the central bank policy rate
and, when unavailable, the money market rate or the long-term bond yield) and the de-
gree of labor market regulations. Changes in the interest rate may affect the cost of
labor relative to capital and hence make employment more or less reactive to changes
in aggregate demand. We also control for differences in the flexibility of the labor mar-
ket (employment protection legislation), which is usually found in the literature to
negatively affect the Okun’s coefficient. θi and θt are the country and year fixed effects,
respectively. εit is the classic error term.
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other potential relevant drivers of the Okun’s coefficient. This is formulated in it's
equation (4) below.
β^ it ¼ γ þ δCFCi;t þ δEFEi;t þ
XJ
j¼1λjXjit þ θi þ θt þ εit ð4Þ
FCi;t denotes fiscal consolidation and F
E
i;t fiscal expansion. δ
C and δE capture the respect-
ive effects of fiscal consolidation and fiscal expansion the Okun’s coefficient. The rest
of the variables are defined as above.
Equations (3) and (4) are estimated with the Weighted Least Squares technique using
the inverse of the standard deviation of β^it . Estimates are corrected for heteroscedasti-
city and autocorrelation at the country level using the robust and cluster options. In
addition, we correct for the fact that the first stage is estimated by using the Weighted
Least Squares technique with the inverse of the standard deviation of the first step. An
intercept is included in all regressions.
3.2 Discretionary fiscal policy
There is, however, a major challenge in correctly identifying the role of fiscal policy on
employment. Fiscal policy instruments and employment gaps can be endogenous, as
changes in employment can trigger immediate fiscal policy responses. To solve for the
endogeneity in government expenditures, we follow the relevant literature including
Fatas and Mihov (2003, 2006), Afonso et al. (2010), and Agnello et al. (2013).3 Discre-
tionary fiscal policy is calculated by extracting the automatic stabilizer component of
public spending. To this end, we estimate a linear “fiscal rule” for each country where
the fiscal balance (Fit) is expressed as function of its lagged value (Fit-1), inflation (πit),
output gap (yit), debt (Debtit), and a time trend (Tt):
Fit ¼ γ0 þ γ1 Fit−1 þ γ2πit þ γ3π2it þ γ4yit þ γ5Debt2it þ γ6Tt þ T it ð5Þ
The residual T it is then taken as the proxy for discretionary policy. The underlying
idea is that after accounting by country and for each variable that captures the condi-
tions of the business cycles, the remaining portion is a good proxy of fiscal activism.
Further, we include lags to solve for endogeneity in tax items and use panel fixed effects
to control for the simultaneous bias. Moreover, estimated as a residual, T it is trend
stationary.
3.3 Data
For the purpose of the analysis, we collect data for a panel of 34 OECD countries for
the period 1985–2013. Data on employment, on real GDP and public spending items
are from the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. Tax rates are from Ilzetzki’s
(2011) database, which has observations for 15 countries for the period 1981–2008.4 Data
on the central bank policy rate, money market rate and long-term bond yield are from the
IMF-International Finance Statistics (IFS) database. Data on employment protection legis-
lation and on spending on labor market policies, both active and passive, are from the
OECD, expressed as percent of GDP. For fiscal consolidations (and expansions) we create
dummies using the definition of consolidations provided by Giavazzi and Pagano (1996)
and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) following Jalles (2014). For Giavazzi and Pagano, a fiscal
Table 1 Okun’s coefficient by country (1985–2013)
Country Okun’s coefficient (employment)
β SD(β) Observations R2
United States 0.422*** (0.0386) 45 0.723
United Kingdom 0.298*** (0.0546) 45 0.443
Austria 0.234*** (0.0343) 45 0.468
Belgium 0.247*** (0.0346) 45 0.502
Denmark 0.342*** (0.0731) 45 0.373
France 0.191*** (0.0397) 45 0.297
Germany 0.343*** (0.0615) 45 0.533
Italy 0.160*** (0.0419) 45 0.209
Luxembourg 0.151*** (0.0512) 45 0.180
Netherlands 0.318*** (0.0578) 35 0.372
Norway 0.323*** (0.0725) 45 0.311
Sweden 0.351*** (0.0743) 45 0.338
Switzerland 0.271*** (0.0590) 45 0.252
Canada 0.423*** (0.0401) 45 0.694
Japan 0.156*** (0.0244) 45 0.391
Finland 0.398*** (0.0668) 45 0.582
Greece 0.160** (0.0764) 45 0.135
Iceland 0.934** (0.445) 45 0.095
Ireland 0.463*** (0.0684) 45 0.515
Portugal 0.276*** (0.0838) 45 0.316
Spain 0.606*** (0.0836) 45 0.667
Turkey 0.00188 (0.0590) 38 0.000
Australia 0.461*** (0.0602) 45 0.494
New Zealand 0.305** (0.145) 45 0.117
Chile 0.220*** (0.0201) 45 0.626
Mexico 0.164*** (0.0358) 35 0.261
Israel 0.168*** (0.0595) 37 0.147
Korea 0.232*** (0.0503) 45 0.452
Czech Republic 0.116 (0.0750) 20 0.163
Slovak Republic 0.231*** (0.0604) 22 0.414
Estonia 0.313*** (0.0623) 22 0.626
Hungary 0.285*** (0.0721) 35 0.417
Slovenia 0.241** (0.0861) 23 0.344
Poland 0.188*** (0.0664) 31 0.229
Panel Estimate 0.273*** (0.0499) 1378 0.122
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Country and year fixed effects are controlled for in the panel estimate
Bova et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:13 Page 9 of 17episode consists of a change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) of at least
2 % of GDP in 1 year or at least 1.5 %, on average, in the last 2 years. Alesina and
Ardagna, instead, consider a limit of 3 percentage points of GDP for a single year consoli-
dation and cumulative changes in the CAPB that are at least 5, 4, 3 percentage points of








































































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1. Australia 2. Canada
3. France 4. Germany
5. Italy 6. Japan
7. United Kingdom 8. United States
Fig. 3 Time-Varying Okun’s coefficients
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4.1 Evidence on Okun’s coefficient heterogeneity
We first provide evidence on the heterogeneity of the Okun’s coefficient over time and
across countries. Table 1 reports the Okun’s coefficients obtained by regressing output
gaps on employment gaps over the period 1985–2013. Cross-country differences are
sizeable. The coefficient ranges from 0.15 for Luxemburg to 0.93 for Iceland, and it is
insignificant for Turkey and the Czech Republic, but positive and significant for all
other countries.
Figure 3 reports the time-varying Okun’s coefficients for the G-8 economies. It shows
large variations for each country over time. Employment’s reaction to output appears
relatively moderate in most countries and particularly low in Japan, Italy, the United
Table 2 Time-varying Okun’s coefficient and fiscal policy instruments
Time-varying Okun’s coefficient (employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Central Bank policy rate (−1) −0.257** −0.318* −0.493*** −0.492*** −0.164 −0.224 −0.227 −0.567 −0.234*** −0.440 −0.469 −0.392
(0.119) (0.158) (0.173) (0.174) (0.421) (0.409) (0.445) (0.478) (0.046) (0.391) (0.395) (0.379)
Employment Protection −0.107*** −0.111** −0.086 −0.085 −0.660* −0.644* −0.667** −0.384 −0.112* −0.0931* −0.100** −0.086*
(0.038) (0.049) (0.091) (0.091) (0.314) (0.329) (0.302) (0.330) (0.062) (0.047) (0.047) (0.0444)
Discretionary expenditure 0.149
(0.262)
Discretionary current exp. 0.298
(0.188)
Discretionary capital exp. 0.0115
(0.298)
PIT rate (−1) 0.118
(0.127)
VAT rate (−1) −0.498
(0.450)
CIT rate (−1) 0.204
(0.221)
SSR rate (−1) −0.166
(0.167)








Observations 753 634 509 509 231 231 231 190 400 604 645 604
R-squared 0.748 0.801 0.819 0.818 0.731 0.733 0.733 0.736 0.916 0.763 0.735 0.771
Number of code 34 34 29 29 14 14 14 13 34 32 32 32
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses












Bova et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:13 Page 12 of 17Kingdom and the United States. During the 1990s, some countries experienced sharp
increases in the sensitivity of employment to output, namely Australia, Germany, Italy,
Japan and the United Kingdom. From the 2000s onwards, most countries see their
Okun’s coefficients increasing, with the exception of Germany and France.4.2 Econometric results
By regressing time-varying Okun’s coefficients on fiscal policy instruments we find no
significant impact (Table 2). The monetary policy rate and employment protection le-
gislation, when significant, have a negative impact on the Okun’s coefficient. For the
monetary policy rate, this could be interpreted as the impact that higher interest rates
have on labor demand independently from the aggregate demand, and possibly induced
by changes in the capital-to-labor ratio, as the cost of capital increases relative to labor.
The sign for the employment protection legislation is in line with what is found in the
literature and suggests that higher protection loosens the link between workers and
firms. Finally, we find that active labor market policies (including training, job rotation
and rehabilitation) are significant and positive, implying that under these policies the
responsiveness of employment to aggregate demand increases. This finding corrobo-
rates the argument put forward in favor of active labor policies and against passive
labor policies, like unemployment benefits, which may distort incentives to improving
employability, taking up a job or searching actively.
Looking at fiscal episodes, we find that fiscal consolidation significantly affects the
Okun’s coefficient by increasing the responsiveness of employment gaps to output gaps
(Table 3). However, fiscal expansions have no impact. On average, the estimated Okun’s
coefficient is 0.273, implying that a 3 percent improvement in output gap would trans-
late into an improvement of the employment gap by 0.8 percentage points and vice versa
during recession periods. All other things being equal, fiscal consolidation improves the
Okun’s coefficient by 0.05 to 0.323. Accordingly, a 3 % improvement in output gap would
translate into to an improvement of the employment gap by 1 percentage point and vice
versa during recession periods. The employment gain on the labor market from fiscal con-
solidation during boom times is approximately 0.2 percentage points. Also, fiscal consoli-
dations when interacted with output expansions (columns 3 and 5) have no different
impact, suggesting that the phase of the cycle does not matter for the impact. The finding
on consolidations bears important policy implications. As the impact is insensitive to the
phase of the cycle, consolidation would harm employment during recessions and would
benefit employment during expansions. Employment protection legislation is always
strongly significant and negative as predicted, while the significance of monetary policy
rate is somehow weaker than in the previous regression.
Table 4 reports the impact of the duration of fiscal episodes, where duration captures
the number of years of the episode. Results show that the duration of fiscal consolida-
tion does matter for the impact, and, in this case too, the impact is independent from
the phase of the cycle. Similarly to the previous findings, the duration of fiscal expan-
sions does not matter for the impact, which is always insignificant.
Table 5 reports the impact of consolidation on the Okun’s coefficient distinguishing
between expenditure-based or revenue-based consolidations. The estimates illustrate
that the impact is totally driven by expenditure-based consolidation, and, as before, it
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sode the reduction of the size of the government in the economy (proxied by spending)
would crowd in the private sector, making employment more reactive to output, than
otherwise. An important factor underlying this finding could be associated to reduc-
tions in the size of unemployment benefits or any passive labor market policies which
would make the labor market less linked to aggregate demand. Arguably, more research
in this direction is needed, especially to detect what component of expenditure drives
mostly the impact on the Okun’s coefficient.
5 Conclusion
Labor market conditions across most OECD countries continue to be significantly
worse than desired by society. Although policy makers and even central bankers pay
close attention to movements in employment and unemployment, the understanding of
how to influence these movements is still limited. In order to design supportive fiscalTable 3 Time-varying Okun’s coefficient and fiscal episodes
Time-varying Okun’s coefficient (employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Central Bank policy rate (−1) −0.255** −0.226* −0.231* −0.236* −0.250*
(0.120) (0.121) (0.125) (0.119) (0.124)
Employment protection legislation −0.108*** −0.0937** −0.0899** −0.0998** −0.0939**
(0.0380) (0.0393) (0.0391) (0.0384) (0.0381)
Dummy output expansion 0.00552 0.00499 0.00360
(0.0056) (0.00801) (0.00646)
Fiscal consolidation GP 0.0543*** 0.0568**
(0.0189) (0.0223)
Fiscal expansion GP 0.0406 0.0273
(0.0264) (0.0253)
Fiscal consolidation GP* Output expansion −0.0039
(0.0257)
Fiscal expansion GP* Output expansion 0.0678
(0.0484)
Fiscal consolidation AA 0.0462** 0.0559**
(0.0184) (0.0228)
Fiscal expansion AA 0.0325 0.00904
(0.0221) (0.0198)
Fiscal consolidation AA* Output expansion −0.0183
(0.0276)
Fiscal expansion AA* Output expansion 0.0935*
(0.0466)
Observations 753 747 747 747 747
R-squared 0.748 0.755 0.758 0.753 0.758
Country 34 33 33 33 33
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
GP refers to fiscal episodes captured following Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and AA refers to fiscal episodes captured
following Alesina and Ardagna (1998)
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it is crucial to understand which policy instruments could be useful.
This study investigates the impact of fiscal policy on labor market outcomes, looking
at how this can affect the way employment reacts to output. To this end, we first inves-
tigate whether the relationship between output and employment, also defined as Okun’s
Law, has changed over time and is different across country and find heterogeneity of
the Okun’s coefficient. Then we test whether fiscal policy could have played a role in
the way these coefficients varied over time and find that individual fiscal policy instru-
ments, whether discretionary spending or tax rates, would not affect this relationship,
but consolidation packages do. On the contrary, we find no evidence of impacts of fis-
cal stimulus on the Okun’s coefficients. We examine how consolidations affect employ-
ment gaps and find that the impact does not change according to the phase of the
cycle (whether in a recession or expansion), but it is stronger the longer the consolida-
tion episodes and is only significant in the case of expenditure-based adjustment.Table 4 Time-varying Okun’s coefficient and duration of fiscal episodes
Time-varying Okun’s coefficient (employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Central Bank policy rate (−1) −0.243* −0.244* −0.238* −0.250*
(0.121) (0.123) (0.119) (0.123)
Employment protection legislation −0.0968** −0.0966** −0.0945** −0.0897**
(0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0397) (0.0396)
Dummy output expansion 0.00559 0.00344
(0.0071) (0.0068)
Duration consolidation GP 0.0170*** 0.0177**
(0.0056) (0.0068)
Duration expansion GP 0.0185* 0.0136
(0.0096) (0.0127)
Duration consolidation GP* Output expansion −0.00175
(0.0102)
Duration expansion GP* Output expansion 0.0117
(0.0121)
Duration consolidation AA 0.0293** 0.0337**
(0.0123) (0.0155)
Duration expansion AA 0.0214 0.00879
(0.0147) (0.0134)
Duration consolidation AA* Output expansion −0.00867
(0.0168)
Duration expansion AA* Output expansion 0.0545**
(0.0262)
Observations 747 747 747 747
R-squared 0.755 0.755 0.755 0.759
Country 33 33 33 33
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
GP refers to fiscal episodes captured following Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and AA refers to fiscal episodes captured
following Alesina and Ardagna (1998)
Table 5 Time-varying Okun’s coefficient and types of fiscal consolidations
Time-varying Okun’s coefficient (employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Central Bank policy rate (−1) −0.244* −0.240* −0.250** −0.246** −0.247** −0.243*
(0.120) (0.122) (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
Employment protection legislation −0.0967** −0.0972** −0.100** −0.0986** −0.0983** −0.0985**
(0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0387) (0.0387)
Dummy output expansion 0.00828 0.00998 0.00990
(0.00845) (0.00694) (0.00705)
Expenditure-based consolidation GP 0.0507** 0.0531**
(0.0223) (0.0248)










Expenditure-based consolidation AA 0.0395* 0.0534**
(0.0205) (0.0239)










Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747
R-squared 0.752 0.752 0.751 0.752 0.752 0.752
Country 33 33 33 33 33 33
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
GP refers to fiscal episodes captured following Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and AA refers to fiscal episodes captured
following Alesina and Ardagna (1998)
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with the literature, employment is less reactive to output at high degrees of labor mar-
ket protection, while active labor market programs seem to adapt more the labor mar-
ket to the needs of the firms, hence increasing the Okun’s coefficient. A novel finding
relates to the way the Okun’s coefficient reacts to changes in the monetary policy rate.
Increases in the rate are in fact almost always statistically significantly associated with
reductions in the Okun’s coefficients: this may reflect lower labor costs relative to cap-
ital, which would, in turn, increase labor demand but independently from aggregate
demand.
Which policy implications can we draw from these results? First, fiscal adjustment
(rather than specific ad hoc fiscal measures) can influence the way employment reacts
to output. This finding adds a contribution to the literature which has traditionally
Bova et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:13 Page 16 of 17found that consolidation is bad for employment. We in fact show that by increasing the
Okun’s coefficient consolidation is bad for employment at times of negative output
gaps, but it would be positive in good times. Hence, consolidating when the economy
is growing would enhance jobs. Cleary this finding omits the interaction between con-
solidation episodes and growth and the implication that a fiscal adjustment has on
growth, which in turn can make consolidation episodes more likely associated with re-
cessions than economic expansions. Second, we show that only a fiscal adjustment
based on expenditure reduction would increase the Okun’s coefficient. Third, fiscal pol-
icy is neither the only nor the main factor to affect the sensitivity of employment to
output. Labor market institutions, such as employment protection legislation and the
presence of active labor market programs, such as training or job rotation, do matter.
Endnotes
1For more analysis on the subject see also Pappa (2009), Cavallo (2005), and Ardagna
(2007).
2The alternative specification includes the rate of change in output and changes in
the unemployment rate.
3An alternative option could have been to use the policy-based approach à la Devries
et al. (2011) and Romer and Romer (2010), which relies on descriptive historical infor-
mation about policy-determined changes in fiscal variables. However, for the purpose
of this analysis, we believe that the Fatas and Mihov procedure can be more easily ap-
plied to specific categories of expenditure.
4Available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ilzetzki/index.htm/Data.htm.
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